Correlated Equilibria and Forecasts based on Naïve Play in Hawk Dove Games (joint with Tridib Sharma (ITAM) and Radovan Vadovic (Carleton))
Tim will be presenting on Zoom, however members of the School are encouraged to meet and watch the presentation in person (Room 132, Sir Llew Edwards Building (#14)).
Abstract
In most games, for equilibrium to result, players need to forecast the equilibrium and choose consistent strategies. We elicit forecasts of outcomes in a series of hawk-dove (aka chicken) games played by other subjects (players). We ask whether these forecasts are consistent with any correlated equilibrium of a class of the games that allow for the possibility of types with non-standard preferences. Indeed, on simple distribution decisions a majority of players make “fair” choices that sacrifice some of their monetary payoff to benefit another anonymous player, and believe that others also have this preference. Surprisingly, even though players are anonymous and randomly matched, forecasters believe that the players' actions are correlated. However, forecasts are not consistent with any correlated equilibrium
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