Testing Belief Elicitation Mechanisms Via Team Chat
Speaker: Prof P.J. Healy
Affiliation: The Ohio State University
Zoom: https://uqz.zoom.us/j/82603079317
Abstract: The binarized scoring rule and multiple price list are two belief elicitation mechanisms that are incentive compatible under fairly general assumptions about preferences. Yet some previous experiments have documented high rates of misreporting in these mechanisms. This suggests that the incentives may be driving subjects to misreport intentionally. We test this by having players report beliefs in teams of two and then analyzing their chat messages to check for evidence of intentional belief misreports. We find very little evidence of such manipulation. Instead, we find that subjects are prone to mistakes and often don't formulate a precise belief. Between the two mechanisms there is no clear winner; the degrees of misreporting and manipulation we observe are quite low for both.
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