We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first relation is used to obtain a shortlist of the feasible alternatives while the second is used to make a final choice. Rules in this class are characterized by four properties: two classical rationality requirements (Sen's expansion consistency and Manzini and Mariotti's weak WARP); and adaptations of two classical collective choice requirements (Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives and Saari and Barney's no preference reversal bias). These rules also satisfy some other desirable properties including a version of May's positive responsiveness.

About the presenter's visit

Prof. Yves Sprumont will be visiting the School of Economics on 17th to 18th March 2022.  While here he will be using room 520A Colin Clark Building. 

If you would like to meet with Prof Sprumont or have lunch or dinner with him please contact Dr Metin Uyanik who will be his host while at The University of Queensland.  Dr Uyanik can be contacted on Metin Uyanik m.uyanik@uq.edu.au.

Read the Two-stage Majoritarian Choice paper

About School Seminar Series

The School of Economics General Seminar Series is held on Fridays. These are in-person and presented by a range of guest researchers from around Australia and internationally.

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Parnell Building (#7), UQ St. Lucia campus
Room 326