A Promise Mechanism to Improve Online Reputation Systems: Evidence from an Experimental Study
Speaker: Prof Erte Xiao
Affiliation: Monash University
Location: Room 207, Chamberlain Building (#35), St Lucia Campus
Zoom: https://uqz.zoom.us/j/82603079317
Abstract: We design and test a simple promise mechanism aimed at addressing the common challenge of insufficient feedback provision in online reputation systems. Before a transaction, buyers are asked to decide whether to promise to report feedback. We examine two distinct mechanisms of soliciting promises: market promise-solicitation, where the market automatically prompts buyers to decide whether to promise to rate sellers after the transaction; and seller promise-solicitation, where the sellers themselves request promises from buyers. Theoretically, both methods may effectively improve the reporting rate and market efficiency. The results of the controlled laboratory experiment show that seller promise-solicitation, but not market promise-solicitation, generates higher reporting and purchasing rates, yielding greater market efficiency. Our data indicate that the effectiveness of seller promise solicitation aligns with the expectation-based motivation theory of promise keeping.
About Centre for Unified Behavioural and Economic Sciences (CUBES) e-seminars
An online seminar series on Experimental and Behavioural Economics organized by the Centre for Unified Behavioural and Economic Sciences (CUBES) of the School of Economics at The University of Queensland.
Our seminars take place fortnightly via Zoom on Wednesdays at 10 am or 5 pm (AEST), depending on whether the guest speaker is streaming from US/Australia or Europe respectively.
Seminars consist of a 60-minute presentation followed by 15 minutes of Q&A.
Local time for seminars
You can check the corresponding times for your own time zone using the following links for each session: 10am, 5pm.
How to register
Clicking the button below gives you the option to register for: (i) all seminars (ii) seminars that take place at 10am or 5pm, or (iii) individual seminars.
Email invitations with a ZOOM link to the event will be sent 48 hours before each seminar.
If you wish to attend an upcoming seminar within the 48-hour window, please drop an email to Lionel Page.