Speaker: Prof Leeat Yariv

Affiliation: Princeton University

Location: Level 6 Boardroom (629), Colin Clark Building (#39), UQ St Lucia Campus.

Online via Zoom:  https://uqz.zoom.us/j/84008636651

Abstract

Starting from Robbins (1952), the economics and statistics literature on experimentation via multi-armed bandits has wed exploration and exploitation. Nonetheless, in many applications, agents' exploration and exploitation need not be intertwined: a policymaker may assess new policies different than the status quo; an investor may evaluate projects outside her portfolio; an employee may explore off-the-job opportunities. We characterize the optimal experimentation policy when exploration and exploitation are disentangled in the case of Poisson bandits, allowing for general news structures. Contrasting the classical setting, the optimal policy always features complete learning asymptotically, while exploration is not identified via an index à la Gittins. The optimal policy exhibits lots of persistence and disentanglement is generically useful. From a welfare perspective, disentanglement is particularly valuable for intermediate values of parameters.

About the presenter's meeting

If you would like to meet with Prof Yariv, please contact Dr Zachary Breig

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Venue

Colin Clark Building (#39)
Room: 
629