Junqian Li (James)


This dissertation consists of three essays on industrial organisation. In the first chapter, I look at the effect of price coherence in a two-sided platform market. Based on a recent case, the theory model predicts that the welfare effect of price coherence depends on the platforms' competition positions. This result can shed light on policies in two-sided market, which attracts much antitrust attention recently. The second chapter investigates the effect of different market institutions in credence good market, with both theory and experimental methods. I find that a combination of reputation and competition can sustain (partial) truth-telling in equilibrium. I find support for this prediction from the experiment data. In the third chapter, I study how an active antitrust authority can affect duopolies' cartel behaviors. From the experiment data, I find evidence that cartel formation and realised market price decrease with a more active antitrust authority.

Time and Zoom link

2pm, Thursday 16 September