Abstract
This paper proposes correlated perfect equilibrium, a refinement of correlated equilibrium through perturbing the correlation device. In finite games, the set of correlated perfect equilibria is non-empty and is a finite union of convex sets. A dual representation is given. Unlike ``trembling hand'' perfections that perturb individual player actions, correlated perfect equilibrium ensures that players share the same posterior belief over joint strategy profiles even conditional on off-equilibrium events. As such, there is no set inclusion relationship between correlated perfect equilibrium and acceptable equilibrium (Myerson, 1986, International Journal of Game Theory), nor with perfect correlated equilibrium (Dhillon and Mertens, 1996, Journal of Economic Theory).
Paper by Priscilla Man, Wanying Huang and Jude Kline
About the presenter’s visit
Dr Priscilla Man is a member of staff of the School of Economics, The University of Queensland. Her room number is 508 Colin Clark Building (#39) and she can be contacted on t.man@uq.edu.au
About Economic Theory Seminar Series
A seminar series designed specifically for economic theory researchers to network and collaborate.
Venue
UQ St Lucia campus
