Abstract
We consider the basic setup of one seller, one buyer, and one good, where the seller is risk averse, and characterize the mechanism that maximizes the seller's expected utility. In contrast to the risk-neutral case, where a single deterministic price is optimal, we show that in the risk averse case the optimal mechanism consists of a continuum of lotteries.
About the presenter’s visit
Tomer Siedner will be visiting the School of Economics on Friday 11th October 2019. While here he will be using room 520A Colin Clark Building. If you would like to meet with him or have lunch or dinner with him please contact Professor Andy McLennan who will be his host while at The University of Queensland. Professor McLennan can be contacted on a.mclennan2@uq.edu.au@uq.edu.au.
About School Seminar Series
The School of Economics General Seminar Series is held on Fridays. These are in-person and presented by a range of guest researchers from around Australia and internationally.
Venue
The University of Queensland
St Lucia campus