Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Empirical Evidence from Italy
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the nature of the contracts between a large health-care purchaser and health service providers in a prospective payment system. We model theoretically the interaction between patients choice and cream-skimming by hospitals. We test the model using a very large and detailed administrative dataset for the largest region in Italy. In line with our theoretical results, we show that the state funded purchaser offers providers a system of incentives such that the most efficient providers both treat more patients and also treat more difficult patients, thus receiving a higher average payment per treatment.
About the presenter's visit
Gianni De Fraja will be visiting the School of Economics 4-7 April. He will be using room 509 Colin Clark Building. If you would like to meet with him or have lunch or dinner with him please contact Dr Rigissa Megalokonomou who will be his host while at UQ. Dr Megalokonomou can be contacted on r.megalokonomou@uq.edu.au.
About School Seminar Series
The School of Economics General Seminar Series is held on Fridays. These are in-person and presented by a range of guest researchers from around Australia and internationally.
Venue
UQ St Lucia campus