Abstract

In this paper we investigate the nature of the contracts between a large health-care purchaser and health service providers in a prospective payment system. We model theoretically the interaction between patients choice and cream-skimming by hospitals. We test the model using a very large and detailed administrative dataset for the largest region in Italy. In line with our theoretical results, we show that the state funded purchaser offers providers a system of incentives such that the most efficient providers both treat more patients and also treat more difficult patients, thus receiving a higher average payment per treatment.

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About the presenter's visit

Gianni De Fraja will be visiting the School of Economics 4-7 April.  He will be using room 509 Colin Clark Building.  If you would like to meet with him or have lunch or dinner with him please contact Dr Rigissa Megalokonomou who will be his  host while at UQ.  Dr Megalokonomou  can be contacted on r.megalokonomou@uq.edu.au.

 

About School Seminar Series

School of Economics seminars are the main academic seminar series held on a Friday. These seminars are presented by guest researchers and enable School of Economics academics to network with other academics from around Australia and internationally.

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Venue

Level 1, Colin Clark Building (#39)
UQ St Lucia campus
Room: 
Room 105