Rationalizable Conjectures in Dynamic Matching
Speaker: Prof Antonio Nicolò
Affiliaiton: University of Padua
Location: Room 101, Chamberlain Building (#35), St Lucia Campus
Zoom: https://uqz.zoom.us/j/82603079317
Abstract: We study a dynamic two-sided matching market in which agents enter over time and remain in the market until they find a match or time expires. Agents who remain unmatched, aiming to secure a better match in the future, form conjectures about the allocations that ultimately will occur. We introduce a procedure to restrict the set of agents’ conjectures which resembles the game-theoretic notion of rationalizability. We propose a new notion of dynamic stability, supported by agents’ rationalizable conjectures. We demonstrate that this notion is always non-empty and it refines previous dynamic stability notions.
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