Speaker: Dr Siqi Pan

Affiliation: The University of Melbourne

Location: Level 6 Boardroom (629), Colin Clark Building (#39), UQ St Lucia Campus.

Online via Zoom: https://uqz.zoom.us/j/84008636651

Abstract

We study how information about priorities or admission chances affects learning in a school choice problem. Students derive utility from a known common component (“school quality”) and an unknown idiosyncratic component (“school fit”). They can learn about the idiosyncratic component, and thus their own preferences, at a cost. Students are assigned to schools using Random Serial Dictatorship, in which a lottery determines students' priorities. Three commonly used policies in practice provide students with vastly different information about priorities. Before students learn about their preferences, they receive no information about their priorities under the “Unknown” policy, full information under the “Known” policy, and partial information under the “Coarse” policy. We show theoretically that, more information about priorities is not necessarily better for student welfare. However, experimentally, more information is better because subjects make fewer strategic mistakes with more clarity and certainty about priorities.

About the presenter's meeting

If you would like to meet with Dr Pan, please contact Dr Allan Hernandez-Chanto

About Centre for Unified Behavioural and Economic Sciences e-seminars

An online seminar series on Experimental and Behavioural Economics organized by the Centre for Unified Behavioural and Economic Sciences (CUBES) of the School of Economics at The University of Queensland.

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Venue

Colin Clark Building (#39)
Room: 
629