Speaker: Prof Li Hao
Affiliation: The University of British Columbia
Online via Zoom: https://uqz.zoom.us/j/84030975989
Abstract
A seller of an indivisible good designs a selling mechanism for a buyer who knows privately the distribution of his value for the good (his type) but not the realization of his value. The seller controls how much additional private information to be released to the buyer who can then use it to refine his value estimate. Under some regularity conditions, the optimal discriminatory disclosure policy is shown to have a nested interval structure. If the information controlled by the seller supersedes the buyer’s initial private information, the optimal profit generally cannot be attained by any selling mechanism without a discriminatory disclosure policy. This remains true even if the seller is restricted to offer the same pricing scheme to all buyer types. If the seller’s information is independent of the buyer’s information, however, there is in general no profit loss in using a non-discriminatory disclosure policy.
About the presenter's meeting
If you would like to meet with Prof. Li Hao, please contact Dr Carlos Oyarzun.
About Economic Theory Seminar Series
A seminar series designed specifically for economic theory researchers to network and collaborate.
