Communication, Perception and Strategic Obfuscation
Speaker: Kareen Rozen
Affiliation: Brown University
Location: Room 629, Level 6, Colin Clark Building (#39), UQ St Lucia Campus or,
Online via Zoom: https://uqz.zoom.us/j/87897991126
Abstract
study the empirical content of simple Sender-Receiver games in which disclosures are mandatory but may be obfuscated. We focus on the fungibility between strategic inference and costly perception, developing a stylized theoretical framework that highlights this channel. Our framework yields crisp testable implications for equilibrium play, and naturally lends itself to an experimental design. Our laboratory results show that a large majority of Senders strategically obfuscate; and an aggregate analysis of Receiver’s stochastic-choice data suggests Receivers adjust their perception in response to strategic inference.
About the presenters meeting
If you would like to meet with Kareen Rozen, please contact: Dr Zachary Breig.
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