HDR Candidate: Pimwilai Kijjanapanich
Title: Credence goods and experts reputation
When: Thursday, 25 March 2021; 9-11am
Where: Zoom
Abstract:
This dissertation studies reputation effects in a credence goods market. Chapter 1 will be a theoretical reply to Ely and V¨alim¨aki’s (2003, Quarterly Journal of Economics) Bad reputation model by pointing out that the dire impact of reputation concerns in their model needs not exist if consumers have an exit option after observing the long-run expert’s recommendation.
In Chapter 2, I will extend the model in Chapter 1 to see the reputation effects when competition between experts is involved.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the reason why the impact of reputation is subtle in credence good experiments. I aim to empirically determine if the belief updating process of the subjects who are assigned to be short-lived players deviates from Bayes’ rule and show that the deviation may alter the overall market outcome.