Walras, Lindahl and Samuelson vs Vickrey, Clarke and Groves

Abstract

We consider general discrete goods environments in which agents have quasilinear payoffs. Paper 1 considers private goods. It shows that if all agents have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, then the VCG transfer of each agent is equal to the largest net Walrasian price of this agent. Consequently, the VCG deficit is equal to the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices over all agents. Generally, whenever Walrasian prices exist, the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices is a non-negative lower bound for the deficit. Paper 2 investigates whether these results extend to the case of public goods. 

About the presenter's visit

If you would like to meet with Claudio Mezzetti, please contact Dr Carlos Oyarzun c.oyarzun@uq.edu.au.