An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism
Speaker: Dr Shino Takayama
Affiliation: The University of Queensland
Location: Level 6 Boardroom (629), Colin Clark Building (#39)
Zoom link: https://uqz.zoom.us/j/82603079317
Abstract:
We provide a generalization of Hall’s marriage theorem. Using this, we describe an implementation of the Generalized Constrained Probabilistic Se-rial (GCPS) mechanism, proposed by Balbuzanov (2022), to problems with feasibility constraints. If the number of agents or objects is not large, our algorithm is computationally tractable. In particular, it can be applicable to school choice problems with a moderate number of schools. In our context, the GCPS mechanism is efficient and has no justified envy. In addition, this mechanism is effectively strategy proof when the number of agents becomes large.
About the presenter:
If you would like to meet with Dr Takayama, please contact Dr Shino Takayama
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