Endogenous Agenda in Collective Sales with Quota

Speaker: Dr Metin Uyanik 
Affiliation: The University of Queensland 
Join in person: Room 629, Level 6, Colin Clark Building (#39), UQ St Lucia Campus or,
Via the Zoom link:  https://uqz.zoom.us/j/82603079317 

Abstract 

In this paper, we study a complete-information collective sale problem with one buyer and multiple sellers who own objects with different values. Holdout (delay or block of projects by sellers) is common under unanimity-rule in collective sale problems, such as a developer buying the entirety of apartment units to complete a development project. Moreover, in these problems, generally the sellers’ valuation of the objects they own are heterogeneous. Motivated by the recent policy practices in strata-sales, we introduce a bargaining model with quota-rule and endogenous bargaining order. We show that under quota-rule, there is no holdout when there are two sellers or players are sufficiently patient in any subgame perfect equilibrium. No-holdout equilibrium is unique, efficient and yields immediate sale of all goods as outcome. The bargaining order in equilibrium depends on players’ valuation of their object relative to their market value and the time horizon. If the horizon is finite, then the sellers with higher valuation can be selected first in equilibrium, whereas in infinite horizon bargaining model, the buyer purchases in increasing order of valuations in equilibrium.