Speaker: Dr Yuki Tamura
Affiliation: NYU Abu Dhabi
Location: Room 207 Chamberlain Building (#35) or,
Zoom link: https://uqz.zoom.us/j/82603079317


For object reallocation problems, Bade (2019) defines a new rule, the “crawler”, and shows that on the domain of single-peaked preferences, this rule satisfies efficiency, the endowments lower bounds, and obvious strategy-proofness. We generalize the crawler, obtaining a family of rules that we call “generalized crawlers”, and show that a rule satisfies efficiency, the endowments lower bounds, and obvious strategy-proofness if and only if it is a generalized crawler. We also provide a structural analysis of the family of generalized crawlers.

About the Speaker

Dr Yuki Tamura is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Center for Behavioral Institutional Design, New York University, Abu Dhabi.
She obtained her PhD at the University of Rochester under the supervision of William Thomson. Her research interests include microeconomic theory, market design, social choice and political economy.

About the presenter’s visit

If you would like to meet with Dr Tamura contact:
Dr Carlos Oyarzun | c.oyarzun@uq.edu.au.


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